Conceptualizing ‘Communication for Peace’

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Abstract

The importance of considering media and other communication processes in the study of conflict formation and escalation has been widely recognized and researched. On the basis of their relevance for those processes, there seems to be a widespread conviction that communication bears similar potential to contribute to conflict transformation, peacebuilding. This kind of assertions, however, as of yet, rest mainly on argumentation in analogy to their role in conflict escalation processes, and therefore largely leave implicit the what and how of such assumed constructive contributions as well as the underlying conceptualization of peace and communication. Together, this makes for a thoroughly fragmented ‘field’ of research from distinct, but still largely insulated disciplines, which carries nonetheless the seeds of a more comprehensive understanding of what is here tentatively termed ‘Communication for Peace’ (C4P) that could provide cross-pollination and contribute to a more thorough engagement with what is an important and increasingly vibrant area of activities. The present paper therefore seeks to examine what could be the groundwork to build a framework for C4P on, to identify the major areas of relevant research that exist, lacunae in this body of work, fruitful intersections between different disciplines and eventually, to provide outlines for a future research agenda. Specifically, the potential of the post-liberal peace critique will be considered as a fruitful theoretical lens for such further endeavors.

Key Words

Media, communication, peacebuilding, peace journalism, communication for peace, conflict
1. Introduction

Communication processes have been widely recognized as vital in times of conflict, specifically in its pre-escalation phases, when propaganda and psychological preparation for hostilities, or even genocide, have been widely documented and analyzed. In recent times, especially since the documentation and wide publication of infamous Radio Mille Collines’ sinister role in the preparation and execution of genocidal violence in Rwanda, the media’s role in conflict escalation has been firmly re-established on the research as well as policy agenda. When also in former Yugoslavia, media were widely and systematically used to propel the flames of hatred and violence, the call for the international community to address the issue of the media in conflicts (as an option somehow in between armed intervention and merely talking within the political fora) became yet more audible; famously summed up by Jamie Metzl’s call to establish an ‘information intervention unit’ within the UN, which would combine the tasks of monitoring, peace broadcasting as well as jamming broadcasts in ‘extreme cases’ in order to prevent escalations. Beyond such envisaged forms of crisis intervention by the UN, though, there is another set of activities that has informed mainly post-conflict media interventions, by a variety of actors (for an informative overview see Howard), aiming more at the long-term that could be considered part of the larger state-building and peace building arsenal.

The seemingly tremendous might often assigned to the media has nurtured the conviction, notably among donors, that if media can help unleash such destructive force and fan outbursts of violence, we must also be able to harness its assumed power for

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good. This has been translated into a variety of activities in the context of peacebuilding. Early examples include projects such as initiated by the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) which aimed at shaping the local information environment in the advent of the 1993 elections or the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) efforts (in conjunction with a large number of NGOs) to reshape the local media landscape in Bosnia-Hercegovina under the Dayton Accords. Within the context of those initiatives, rather than merely intervening in a crisis situation to possibly contribute to de-escalation, the aim of democratization, by means of creating ‘independent’ and ‘pluralistic’ media, has become more pronounced. At the same time, the restructuring of the media system to ‘secure freedom of expression’ has also often gone hand in hand with wide discretionary powers to discipline and ‘one of the most comprehensive possible catalogues of the exercise of authority’ on an often dubious legal basis. The end of the Cold War has made media development and media assistance strategies more prominent. So, during the past two decades, (overt) donor involvement in local media projects has intensified - if still lacking reliable evaluation methodologies that could shed more light on their effectiveness.

Beyond structural interventions in post-conflict media environments, there are a number of activities with the broader shared interest in aspects of peacebuilding, such as peace journalism initiatives, public information campaigns of peace operations or edutainment oriented programs aimed at fostering reconciliation processes.

The present article primarily seeks to survey existing research streams and to subsequently make the case for the need for a more integrated, truly multi-disciplinary

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research agenda to further our understanding and critical analysis of the role of communication in peacebuilding, in terms of theory as well as practice.

The study will first briefly introduce C4D as a potential starting point to conceptualize the role of communication for peace and review the development of ideas about peacekeeping and -building within the UN and other relevant actors, paying specific attention to the role of communication and media that has been carved out within their activities.

Subsequently, some major areas of relevant existing research within communication science as well as international law and conflict studies that share an interest in C4P will be identified. It is argued that there is still a lack of theoretical engagement with C4P, which will be needed in order to better understand and evaluate the ongoing and intensifying dynamics ranging from the use of ICTs for conflict mapping and early response to internationals’ efforts to structurally ‘reform’ whole media systems of target states.

Lastly, the critique of the dominant liberal peace paradigm will be considered and applied to the area of communication for peace and the broad lines for a research agenda will be drawn.

2. From ‘Communication for Development’ to ‘Communication for Peace’?

In its 1996 Inventory of Post-Conflict Peace-Building Activities, the UN classified ‘local media as a cross-cutting peace building issue, transcending all categories of activities’\(^5\). Yet, still in 2008, Kalathil, Langlois and Kaplan find that ‘one area of post-conflict reconstruction and development remains relatively under-examined: media and communication’, which ‘both in research and in the field [...] remains an afterthought, frequently treated as part of public relations strategy rather than an integral and technical component of the post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction process’\(^6\).\(^iii\)

So, despite a surge in donor activities involving communication projects related to peace, an emerging consensus concerning the aims, methods or purposes of when and how to

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‘use’ communication as a part of engagements in post-conflict environments is hardly visible. In the field, more often than not, donors do not tend to even make a distinction between their outreach and public relations activities and their communication programs aimed at supporting processes of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. Accordingly, such projects still entail a plethora of activities, executed without much coordination, long-term orientation or eye for potential synergies and within a fragmented theoretical framework with ‘very few institutionalized guiding norms and principles that can be applied by experts and non-media specialists alike to achieve lasting results.’ So whereas the recognition that communication and media are a ‘cross-cutting issue’ in peacebuilding seems to be shared by most actors in the field today, this ‘gut feeling’ seems as of yet not to have brought forth deep and self-reflective engagement with the assumed roles and benefits of communication, its very conception and also, its proper place within organizational structures or systematic analysis and evaluation. This is especially ironic given the historical origins of communication science as a distinct discipline after WWI, came with an explicit preoccupation with mass media effects when it comes to mobilizing people for war. There has been, however, a relatively recent (re-)focus on the role of journalism and media representation of conflict in times of war and conflict escalation more generally discernible within the discipline, especially since the mid-90s. However, still, little cross-pollination or trans-disciplinary research has been undertaken, least with a focus on media roles in processes of peace.

This is not to say, however, that there were no historical precedents or relevant theory when it comes to engagement with the role communication plays in peacebuilding. Communication for Development (C4D) as a field of study may then be a helpful starting point here.

From the very beginning of the UN system, in fact, we find a preoccupation with communication as the central process of human interaction at the root of many efforts to create a communication environment and modes of exchange that would help prevent a relapse into war, foster human dignity and, eventually, a global order more conducive to peace. In 1946, during its very first session, the UN General Assembly dealt with the Freedom of Information, declaring it in Resolution 59(I) the ‘touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated’. Within the context of the

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7 Ibid., 7.  
8 Ibid., 15.
immediate post-war era, the securing of the Freedom of Expression in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) in 1948 (and its later codification in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966) was explicitly linked to the desire of building a more peaceful future, between and within states, echoing a belief that communication has a significant role to play in this endeavor. As the preamble to the UNDHR put it:

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people

Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law

Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations

In a similar vein, the founding document of UNESCO famously included the rather sweeping statement that ‘since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed’, emphasizing the psychological elements crucial to lasting peace.

During the de-colonization process, the call for a New World Economic Order was complemented with that for a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO), recognizing the importance of not only economic but cultural self-determination, specifically through processes of communication⁹. The 1980 report issued by the MacBride commission that had been tasked to investigate the status quo of international communication at the time, subsequently laid the foundations for a normative discourse surrounding the role of communication to make humanity more resistant to war and susceptible to peace. Nowhere, however, as Ivie points out, did it coherently theorize or conceptualize such a practice:

While the MacBride commissioners recognized the role of symbols, gestures, language, and images in the makeup of messages, they did not pursue the question of how these elements of

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discourse can work in the interactions of common citizens to constitute and strengthen cultural investments in peace\textsuperscript{10}

In congruence with the dynamics of the Cold War, the call for a NWICO was rejected by prominent Western nations for its critical stance towards corporate control of communication flows, its emphasis on change for social justice and attack on continuing forms of imperialism. Following NWICO’s political demise after the UK’s and US’s strategic withdrawal from UNESCO in 1984, the organization concentrated its efforts on less divisive and apparently apolitical activities such as technical assistance, moving away from its South/East outlook and to do its ‘utmost to appeal to the West\textsuperscript{11}’.

While with this clash, also further thinking about the role of communication in building a more peaceful society seems to have been largely muted, ideas about the role of communication - and media specifically - within the processes of development became increasingly elaborated. The evolution of the field of Communication for Development has since closely mirrored the development within Development Studies more generally\textsuperscript{12}. So, during the 1960s, modernization theorists advocated the use of mass media to encourage the diffusion of new ideas and information which would stimulate people also to behave in new ways. This diffusion would in all cases be initiated externally by international ‘experts’, then channeled through the mass media to local elites that would ultimately mend the ‘backwards’ ways of the masses in a ‘two-step flow’ of communication, while those new ways were to be modeled according to what was believed to be a linear model of development towards an industrial ‘modern’ society:

From the West came the stimuli which undermined traditional society in the Middle East; for reconstruction of a modern society that will operate efficiently in the world today, the West is still a useful model. \textit{What the West is, in this sense, the Middle East seeks to become}\textsuperscript{13}.

Dependency critiques subsequently emerged during the 1970s that inter alia emphasized


the continuing and intensifying technological and economic dependence that was a consequence of models for development that prioritized top-down processes and modeling ‘under developed’ societies along the line of specifically Western paths and chronologies. Within this context, the so-called ‘free flow of information’ doctrine advocated for by the West was seen to effectively translate into a ‘one way flow’ from the center to the peripheries, which would only work to intensify cultural imperialism (see e.g. Schiller\textsuperscript{14} and Dorfman & Mattelart\textsuperscript{15}).

By the 1980s, concepts such as sustainability, grassroots participation and empowerment had largely made their mark on these debates. Within the discourse surrounding the role of media, participatory - if in practice often only nominally, with local agency often ‘accepted by internationals for geopolitical and expedient reasons, rather than for a genuine and pluralist engagement’\textsuperscript{16} - development approaches mostly emphasized the importance of media that ought to be independent of state control and often translated in local community media projects.

At the same time, Communication for Social Change, as well as Advocacy Communication, have come to be the most common denominator for research ranging from the effectiveness of health campaigns to rural development.\textsuperscript{17} For example, in advocacy communication, creating public demand and involving interest groups for a particular cause is thought be best served with activation of the media to ‘build upward pressure for policy decisions’.

Still, some commentators have suggested, remnants of the modernization paradigm are still easily recognizable in the assumptions and methodologies underlying many current projects, especially those in the realm of using ‘new’ ICTs for development that all too often recline into the comfortable but largely discredited assumptions of technological

\textsuperscript{14} Herbert I. Schiller, \textit{Communication and cultural domination} (New York: International Arts and Sciences Press 1976).
determinism and an ingrained assumption of moral superiority of Northern models of
development (see e.g. De Miranda\textsuperscript{18}; Lynch\textsuperscript{19}).

In sum, while Communication for Development is a relatively well-developed and
theorized area of inquiry, there is of yet no equivalent body of knowledge and enquiry of
what could be termed ‘Communication for Peace’ (C4P). The next section will
subsequently investigate what could be the groundwork to build a framework for C4P on.

3. Communication for Peace: a brief overview of activities

There are a broad variety of actors engaged in a wide range of activities when it comes to
communication for peace. Local governments, media organizations and NGOs, sometimes
supported by or alongside of international news media, training organizations,
national organizations engaged in peace operations, UN agencies (such as UNDP,
UNESCO) as well as bilateral donors (such as USAID, DFID) and INGOS (such as Hirondelle,
USIP, OSi).

Accordingly, activities taking place on the ground are similarly varied, including what
Metzl\textsuperscript{20} has termed ‘information interventions’; including ‘negative’ interventions (e.g.
jamming broadcast signals, bombing radio transmitters), establishing new media/’peace
broadcasting’ (e.g. Radio Okapi, DRC) and more structural, long-term interventions, such
as technical assistance in drafting laws that shape the communication environment or
engaging in journalism training and technical capacity building activities. Related to this
are projects that are more focused on monitoring media content as well as ownership
(such as UNESCO, Freedom House, IREX, but also many local actors).

Another large category of relevant activities falls within the category of ‘Public
Information’ as part of Peace Operations, which has seen progressive changes in parallel
with the changing nature of Peacekeeping itself during the past decennia (see for more

\textsuperscript{18} Alvaro De Miranda, ‘Technological Determinism and Ideology: Questioning the
‘Information Society’ and the ‘Digital Divide’’, Online publication at Centro de Estudos
Sociais (CES) of Universidade de Coimbra (2003). Available online at:
13 February 2012].

\textsuperscript{19} Jake Lynch, ‘Modernisation or participatory development: the emerging divide in
journalist training for conflict-affected societies,’ \textit{Global Change, Peace & Security} 20 no 3

\textsuperscript{20} Metzl, \textit{Information Intervention}, 15-20.
detail below). Furthermore, there is a large area of projects, which are proactively and explicitly engaged in ‘outcome oriented’, behavior change programs, which are usually either focusing on specific issues and/or target groups or set up to foster more long-term and general goals such as reconciliation (e.g. SFCG).

Peace Operations and Communication

Peacekeeping, as an activity of the international community through the UN, was initially viewed as a purely military affair - accordingly, no component of communication strategy was envisaged in its early days. To the extent that there was a so-called Public Information (PI) strategy involved in missions, historically, its purpose was aimed at communication with UN Headquarters and representation of the missions to international mass media audiences\(^21\). Since its mission in the late 1980s in Namibia, the UN has employed ‘civic education and its own forms of media to promote awareness among the general public about its mandate and the peace process\(^22\). An important transformation, however, began with the United Nations Transitional Authority Cambodia (UNTAC), which in 1992 pioneered the use of a variety of communication media (including radio, posters) in the context of elections and led to somewhat more attention to public information in the planning stages of UN missions. Still, Cambodia’s Radio UNTAC is seen as one of the major successes of UN information operations\(^23\).  

In the evolution of peace operations, the Brahimi Report of 2000 can be pinpointed as a promising moment of introspection after the disasters of Rwanda, Srebrenica and Somalia; a number of its recommendations having implications for and relating to the role of communication, specifically in terms of the public information function identified within peace operation missions. While the report arguably succeeded in enhancing the attention to public information, in 2008, Kalathil, Langlois and Kaplan nonetheless still conclude that ‘it is still fairly low down on the list of priorities in peacekeeping operations.

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\(^{22}\) Susan Manuel, ‘Reviving War’s First Casualty: How the UN Communicates in Post-Conflict Turmoil’, in Media, conflict prevention and reconstruction (Paris: UNESCO 2004), 37

\(^{23}\) Hunt, Public Information as a Mission, 38
operations’ and conceived of in terms of public relations, while there seems to be little documentation and thus a loss of institutional memory\textsuperscript{24}.

In terms of the practice of PI in subsequent missions, UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone (1999-2005) and UNMIL in Liberia (2003) have been highlighted by Hunt\textsuperscript{25} as watershed moments, not only for their creative campaigns using theater, music and dance\textsuperscript{vii}, but specifically for the unprecedented shift in perceptions of its priority target groups:

Although international audiences remain important to the life of the mission, it has become clear that PI’s priority function is to reach out to the local population and it is this realisation that has dramatically altered the way in which PI is processed.

So, by the time of the mission to Liberia, the ‘importance of immediate communication with the population via radio to explain the arrival of a peacekeeping operation had become foremost in the thinking of UN public information planners\textsuperscript{26}. Still, as a study on the UN’s interim administration missions in Kosovo had already pointed out, public information has remained rather narrowly defined and mainly focused on disseminating information about and ‘explaining’ the activities on the ground, more generally transmitting the preferred ‘message’, locally and internationally; and on internal communication processes\textsuperscript{27}. Also in the context of its West African missions, Hunt concedes that ‘categorical support for the mission and the peace process remains the overarching goal and obligation for PI in peacekeeping’\textsuperscript{28} while ‘[i]t is [...] in deriving consent from this [local] audience for a political process that PI has become a critical component of contemporary peacekeeping\textsuperscript{29}.

Surely it should be recognized that peace missions are extremely varied and take place under very different circumstances: so for example, while the UN was explicitly mandated with controlling the information environment in Cambodia, its activities in Former Yugoslavia were much less influential in the face of resistance of sovereign nations that were not interested much in granting it radio frequencies. Yet, it seems that within

\textsuperscript{24} S. Kalathil, J. Langlois and A. Kaplan, \textit{Towards a New Model}, 40
\textsuperscript{25} Hunt, \textit{Public Information as a Mission}, 33
\textsuperscript{26} Manual, \textit{Reviving War’s First Casualty}, 40.
\textsuperscript{27} Loewenberg, \textit{United Nations Media Strategy}.
\textsuperscript{28} Hunt, \textit{Public Information as a Mission}, 34.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid, 33.
contemporary peace missions, communication has long been looked at predominantly as an instrument (in the best case as a ‘mission critical function’) rather than a ‘public good in and of itself’ and set up without a long-term vision of even recognition of the potential need of such a vision or correspondingly appropriate exit strategies.

At the same time, the complexities and demands of such missions have only been rising, as for example with UNMIK (1999) in Kosovo facing

the dual challenge of how to communicate directly with the population on the authority of its transitional administration while at the same time fostering the development of independent and responsible media.

With the founding of Radio Okapi in 2001 (a cooperative effort of Swiss NGO Hirondelle and the UN’s Mission MONUC in DRC) another notable shift from earlier UN public information campaigns has been noted: the station’s aim has not solely been to convey information about the UN mission, but to ‘enable the people of the Congo to communicate with their compatriots’ and was from the outset designed as a long-term project.

Despite generally positive reaction to the work of the radio network, as a rule there are few formal evaluations and assessment models to investigate just how exactly such media projects contribute to efforts of reconstruction, peacebuilding and ‘good governance’, which they are usually linked with. As Kalathil, Langlois and Kaplan rightly point out, this is at least partly a problem of problem definition, since when communication is seen solely as a tool, also impact measures tend to be ill-defined and confusing. Yet, if successive peace missions are incorporating more and increasingly broader public information functions within their mandates (including activities related to media development more recently), it will be a matter of necessity for those involved in setting them up to engage in the development and furtherance of the very concept of Public Information, make explicit its aims and underlying assumptions, integrate credible

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30 Ibid, 35.
31 Kalathil, Langlois and Kaplan, Towards a New Model, 39.
32 Hunt, Public Information as a Mission, 37.
34 Kalathil, Langlois and Kaplan, Towards a New Model, 41.
evaluation strategies, effectively use public outreach access to the grassroots level to engage in truly interactive communication processes, and ultimately justify its methods and tools, also in reference to their potential (long-term) effects on a media system of post-conflict societies. viii

4. Post-conflict ‘information interventions’: Communication as an Element of Democratization and Governance

At this point, it should be noted that there are a variety of actors that engage in such activities, other than merely the official UN missions. A plethora of mostly what Richmond calls internationals is active ‘in the field’ and engaging in a variety of initiatives that aim at harnessing communication for their purposes. During the past two decades, media and peacebuilding has in fact become an integral part of many major donors’ policies on foreign aid and intervention, including the European Community, the US, UNESCO, the World Bank36. Such activities are also mostly framed in terms of democratization and governance, making media policies a part of the broader state-building ‘toolbox’, in which the fostering of independent media is promoted as part of democratic governance (e.g. as priority of large donors such as DFID or the National Endowment for Democracy).

Also here, the media have come to be recognized as increasingly important, if nonetheless still mostly in the form of strategic communication often explicitly aimed at behavior change among the envisaged audience, perceived to mold existing social norms to make them more conducive to lasting peace.

An example for this can be found in the definition of the Stabilisation Unit UK Department for International Development - a major donor in this area with disproportionate influence on policy and priorities also of other donors37:

Strategic communication (Strat Comms) refers to the way in which policies and actions are communicated to the public (local and international), in order to build up an alliance of people willing to support desired

37 Kalathil, Langlois and Kaplan, Towards a New Model, 41. Emphasis mine.
outcomes. Successful strategic communication is an integral and transformational part of delivery; a two-way process, and key to bringing about change in attitudes, beliefs and behaviours in the people upon whom stabilisation success depends.\textsuperscript{ix}

A similar perspective on the nature of communication activities can be gauged from many other contributions to the policy and academic debate (e.g. Fortune & Bloh\textsuperscript{38}). Even in contributions that explicitly call for the need for more ‘local ownership’ of communications and media initiatives that seek to contribute to peacebuilding, such as e.g. Haselock\textsuperscript{39} writing in a USIP publication, the purpose of increasing the amount of listening, rather than merely transmitting information, clearly remains a concern of ‘effectiveness’, presumably connected to the a priori envisioned ‘impact’ on the audience:

The most effective stabilization and reconstruction programs are those in which local professionals, civil society, and communities have participated and taken ownership. [...] Demand-driven development projects are the most likely to succeed, but they require an approach to communications that places as much emphasis on listening to the local population as on transmitting information to it.

A consonant assumption is echoed in Kalathil, Langlois and Kaplan’s study for the World Bank, when they call for a more participatory approach when engaging in communication initiatives in post-conflict situations, since, in their analysis, ‘when a participatory approach underlies even rapidly executed BCC [Behaviour Change Communication] or other communication activities, it is more likely to find receptive audiences and a change for a genuine program success\textsuperscript{40}’.

This way, the still dominant conceptualization of communication as a means rather than a public good in itself, combined with a rather large spectrum of communication-related activities, also leads to confusion surrounding the job profile of professionals engaged in communication related tasks, which will often include press release writing, supporting participatory communication activities with local civil society and working to develop an independent media sector at the same time. This is also mirrored in the approach to

\textsuperscript{39} Simon Haselock, ‘The Imperative of Local Ownership in Communications and Media Initiatives,’ \textit{Special Report}, 253, Center of Innovation for Science, Technology, and Peacebuilding, United States Institute of Peace (October, 2010). Emphasis mine.
\textsuperscript{40} Kalathil, Langlois and Kaplan, \textit{Towards a New Model}, 54.
communication that is evident in the activities of many of the larger donors, that blend technical issues with public relations leading to a ‘general murkiness [...] over how communication should be treated within a development and governance context’, leaving communication and media activities ‘exist[ing] in a strange netherworld: most donors fail to consider communication as anything other than another term for ‘messaging’, much less a fundamental area that is crucial to stabilization, reconstruction, and other key goals in these environments’.

Such a preoccupation with the strategic use of communication is also the dominant tone in most academic contributions, as e.g. Bratic and Schrich summarize:

Conflict prevention and peace-building professionals can use the media in harmony with their other programs - if they know when, why, and how to use the media for the most strategic impact in lessoning the polarization between groups. On the other hand, media professionals still have much to learn about why and when their work can contribute to preventing violent conflict and building peace between groups.

The above is a telling extract of a piece of work that is broadly representative for most existing publications on the issue in that it focuses primarily on communication as a strategic tool to bring about a priori defined, preferably quantifiable and thus measureable, outcomes (such as changes in attitudes, knowledge levels or behavior) and in that it explicitly reasons from the vantage point of the ‘professional’ practitioner in the field (while there is certainly nothing inherently inferior about knowledge emanating from the field, the overall lack of analytical engagement with the theoretical underpinnings of such practices is certainly deplorable).

The few existing attempts to theorize or at least conceptualize the role of communication for peace vary widely in their focus and approach, mirroring the splintered nature of the field (if it could be called a ‘field’ at all) that seems to be at least partly a result of the fact that ‘there is no natural scholarly silo in which to develop research of this type’. The below section of this articles thus seeks to map the boundaries of such a potentially

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41 ibid, 41
42 ibid, 13
44 Howard, The Media’s Role.
45 Kalathil, Langlois & Kaplan, Towards a New Model, 9.
emerging scholarly ‘silo’ and draw attention to a number of interesting interactions between disciplines.

5. Seeds for C4P: An Overview of Relevant Research Areas

A number of related relevant research foci can be distinguished when including in the below listing only those efforts that explicitly contain a concern for peace - as opposed to a link solely by implication by focusing on conflict. While the below is proposed here as an overview of the most important and visible foci of engagement with the theme of media, communication and peace, by no means is it attempted here to provide a comprehensive overview of all relevant areas of endeavor. Another important caveat is that much knowledge in this area, as mentioned above, emanates not from within academia, but ‘the field’ such as in the form of self-evaluations such as those published e.g. by Search for Common Ground (SFCG) relating to their behavior change programming or can merely be implicitly deduced from reports of activities such as e.g. the UN when setting up radio stations supporting peacekeeping forces.

Concerning media performance/the nature of journalism

- Coverage of mainstream media of peace negotiations (e.g. Wolfsfeld\textsuperscript{46}), assessing mainly the impact of publicity and framing on the success of negotiations and public opinion and interactions between belligerents and the cycle of mutual influences during peace processes (also referred to as the PMP principle), specifically also concerning the disproportional reliance on elite sources (see e.g. Bennett 1990).
- Critiques of Northern ethnocentrism in selection, timing and representations of news stories about ‘the Other’ (e.g. Franks\textsuperscript{47}; Hawkins\textsuperscript{48}; Myers, Klak & Koehl\textsuperscript{49}),

\textsuperscript{46} Gadi Wolfsfeld, \textit{Media and the Path to Peace} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
\textsuperscript{49} Garth Myers, Thomas Klak and Timothy Koehl, ‘The inscription of difference: news coverage of the conflicts in Rwanda and Bosnia,’ \textit{Political geography} 15 no 1 (1996): 21-46.
the representation of distant suffering and its potential impact on moral emotions and action tendencies of audiences, a fascination with simplicity, violence and drama (e.g. van Ginneken; Wolfsfeld); mainly explained in terms of prevailing news values (Galtung & Ruge) or the political economy of the news media (e.g. Thussu; McChesney & Schiller) that determine news production, linked to peace mostly by suggesting biased coverage breeds inertia, compassion fatigue in audiences (e.g. Moeller) and tends to imply self-evident, apolitical solutions in potential donor audiences or lack of policy to prevent escalations as well as support conflict resolution and reconciliation.

- Critiques of (mainly Northern) mainstream media coverage of conflict (mainly in the Global South) from the perspective of peace and conflict studies and proposals for a more critical journalistic paradigm in the form of Peace Journalism (e.g. Galtung & Lynch; Lynch & McGoldrick) or, more recently, Human Rights Journalism - this includes mainly normative but also empirical work, mainly using quantitative content analysis, or more qualitative methods such as discourse analysis, intending to measure the extent to which media adhere to the paradigm of what is referred to as ‘war journalism’ as well as theoretical work that is concerned with the normative foundations of the role of journalists in society, but

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50 Studies that refer to varieties of what is often called ‘compassion fatigue’ often assume certain effects of media coverage of disasters and war on audiences, which are however hardly ever investigated empirically.


54 Daya Thussu, Media on the move: global flow and contra-flow (Routledge, 2006).


also extending to policies of journalism training in post-conflict societies (see e.g. Lynch\textsuperscript{60}).\textsuperscript{x1} A turn towards researching the reception side of alternative journalistic practices is relatively rare still (Philo\textsuperscript{61}; Lynch\textsuperscript{62}; Lynch & McGoldrick\textsuperscript{63})

- Critiques of the tendency of news media for engaging in ‘spotlight’ coverage of conflicts and humanitarian emergencies only when and for as long a dramatic footage is available, meaning a relative blackout before (even foreseeable) violence or disaster as well as after such events, when the crucial phases of reconstruction/peacebuilding set in. (e.g. “Rather than just covering wars, the media should pay more attention before a conflict erupts and after the fact, examine efforts at conflict resolution and ways the news media could actually support reconciliation and peace” (Thompson\textsuperscript{64}; see also Hawkins\textsuperscript{65})

- Interest in the role of diaspora online media platforms as potential contributors to peace processes in their countries of origin (e.g. Brinkerhoff\textsuperscript{66}; Skjerdal\textsuperscript{67})

- Monitoring initiatives (mostly outside of the academic realm) such as e.g. the Media Sustainability Index, Media Monitoring Africa (MMA) etc.

- The implications of values of non-violence or mindfulness for communication (Hamelink\textsuperscript{68}; Juluri\textsuperscript{69}).


\textsuperscript{65} Hawkins, Media selectivity and the other side of the CNN effect, 2011


\textsuperscript{68} Cees Hamelink, Media and Conflict: Escalating Evil (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2010).

Concerning media roles and effects on audiences in post-conflict situations

- Methodology and evaluation of ‘outcome-oriented’ media projects, chiefly based on a variant of the so-called KAB (Knowledge, Attitudes and Behaviour) approach, emanating from health communication. These include predominantly local radio programs using edutainment formats to translate theories of reconciliation, trauma healing and violence prevention in ‘messages’ to solidify peace (e.g. Staub et al70; Paluck71; Bratic & Schirch72; Melone, Terzis & Beleli73;74
- Design and evaluation of ‘peace broadcasters’ in post-conflict situations (Curtis75; Bratic76)
- Initial reviews of relevant media effects theories applicable to different stages of conflict (Gilboa77) and relevant for peacebuilding processes (Bratic78)
- Attempts to integrate models of escalation and media roles as amplifiers as well as potential stimulants to distill criteria for de-escalation oriented coverage (Kempf79) or match media roles with conflict phases (Gilboa80) as well as pairing potential interventions with distinct conflict phases (Howard81).

70 Ervin Staub, Laurie Anne Pearlman, George Weiss and Anneke van Hoek, Public Education through Radio to Prevent Violence, Promote Trauma Healing and Reconciliation, and Build Peace in Rwanda and the Congo. (No Date) Available online at: (http://people.umass.edu/estaub/radio%20article%20--January%202008.pdf)
72 Bratic & Schirch, Why and When to Use the Media.
74 See also SFCG’s online platform http://www.radiopeaceafrica.org.
75 Curtis, Broadcasting Peace, 141-166.
76 Bratic, Examining Peace-Oriented Media, 487-503.
78 Bratic, Examining Peace-Oriented Media, 487-503.
80 Eytan Gilboa, Media and Conflict Resolution, 2009
81 Howard, The Media’s Role.
Concerning policies and international law relevant to the engagement of international actors

- Analyzing the international legal frameworks and practices of media intervention, including
  - negative targeting of media outlets to curb ‘hate speech’ (Thomson & Price\textsuperscript{82}; Frère\textsuperscript{83}) and international legal perspectives on the prohibition of the incitement to genocide and the responsibility to protect (Hoffmann & Okany\textsuperscript{84}) and using the media as early warning mechanisms more generally (Hamelink\textsuperscript{85})
  - journalism education/development (Howard\textsuperscript{86}; Lynch\textsuperscript{87})
  - restructuring and ‘development’ of the media landscape in post-conflict situations; independent media as part of democratic governance (DFID priority) (e.g. Allen & Stremlau\textsuperscript{88}; Najjar\textsuperscript{89}; Robertson, Fraenkel, Schoemaker & Himelfarb\textsuperscript{90}; Kumar\textsuperscript{91}; Kalathil, et al.\textsuperscript{92})

\textsuperscript{85} Cees Hamelink, ‘Media between warmongers and peacemakers’. \textit{Media, War & Conflict} 1 no 1, (2008): 77-83.
\textsuperscript{86} Howard, \textit{An operational framework}.
\textsuperscript{88} Tim Allen and Nicole Stremlau, ‘Media policy, peace and state reconstruction’, \textit{Crisis States Research Centre discussion papers} 8 (London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2005)
\textsuperscript{92} Kalathil, et al., \textit{Towards a New Model}. 
• Analysis of the role of the media assigned in military doctrine concerning peace and stability operations (e.g. Himelfarb93).
• Analysis of impact of international media coverage on foreign policy decision-making and ‘humanitarian intervention’ (e.g. Livingston94; Gilboa95) and international law more generally (Joyce96)
• Humanitarian NGOs’ increasingly professionalized communication strategies and interactions with the media (Cottle & Nolan97; Vestergaard98)

6. The emerging area of ‘ICT4Peace’

Much ink has been spilled on the ‘revolutionary’ impact of social media, especially in the context of the Arab Spring, apparently shattering all we used to know about the nature and effects of ‘the media’. Expectations for ‘new’ media to overthrow oppressive governments, bring more transparency to international politics (such as Wikileaks), re-activate young people to reinvent political participation and generally contribute to a more peaceful world due to its inherent characteristics have been high. While by now the initially perhaps somewhat overly unfettered enthusiasm and hopes for the revolutionary potential of ‘shiny’, ‘new’ media has been toned down among practitioners in the field of communication for peace (see e.g. USIP), the availability of new technologies has not only challenged the continuing relevance of certain established convictions about the workings of communication processes in societies, but has also brought about new fields of application. So far, the game-changing impact of the still emerging area of application in ‘ICT4Peace’ seems to be especially pronounced when it comes to handling and responding to humanitarian crises, whether triggered by violence or natural disasters. There is also an increasing focus on convergence and the combination of mobile technology with mapping

capabilities, using crowd sourcing and crowd feeding methods for early warning (such as Ushahidi\textsuperscript{xii}, pioneered in the context of post-election violence in Kenya in 2008) and optimizing logistical planning and responsiveness (as e.g. in Haiti).

Campaigns to promote peace and reconciliation through information can and do take many forms, addressing different audiences from policy makers and elites to local and diaspora communities. Information campaigns using ICT can also accompany preventive diplomacy efforts in building peace. Using initiatives which are not markedly ‘international’ or ‘official’ then, these soft or informal diplomacy approaches (also called Track II diplomacy) by non-state actors can also be aimed at de-escalating conflicts\textsuperscript{99}. But how effective these campaigns can be as peacebuilding measures or whether they translate into real constructive efforts on the ground in the wake of a ICT or media based peacebuilding measure may depend on a number of other factors unrelated to the intrinsic nature of the measure itself e.g.: ‘in addition to providing technology, funding, and training, international actors may need to promote the independence of the media and emphasize the negative consequences of government attacks on the media\textsuperscript{100}).

Yet, especially the promise of more widely accessible mobile technology is invoked for activities of conflict prevention, peace operations as well as post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction, and in addition for creating potential new ways of data collection and thus new avenues for program evaluation and design (e.g. Search for Common Ground, 2011).\textsuperscript{xiii} Perhaps most importantly, however, those technologies have made it much easier for those individuals who are usually the objects of peacebuilding initiatives to engage in and amplify their own initiatives for peace, quite independent from any outside interventions, using platforms such as Facebook or Twitter, e.g. to bridge divides between polarized groups\textsuperscript{xiv} (this will be elaborated further below).

In an initial attempt to visualize some of the most pertinent research interests that would make up the area of Communication for Peace, the below figure may be helpful.

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\textsuperscript{100} Ibid, 45
"Communication for Peace"

- Popular culture & representation (gender, ‘race’, disability...)
- Outcome oriented ‘peace media’ interventions (KAB)
- Effects of media coverage of on peace negotiations
- Media development/journalism education
- Peace Journalism
- (post-conflict) Media Regulation & Law
- ‘new’ media
- Quantity & Quality of news stories about ‘the Other’
- Effects on Audiences (understanding, empathy, public opinion)
- ‘Public information’

Figure: Visualizing elements of Communication for Peace
7. Communication for peace and the post-liberal peace critique

Feeling the comfort of eyes is your sole intention
We all want to be understood unconditionally
But you have to realize that a viewer needs distance
And the moment your wall melts down the inside is outside
(...)
We've got four eyes, so why yearn for one perspective?
We've got colours with shades erased when blended
We've got four eyes, so why yearn for one perspective?
We've got colours, but they disappear when blended

(Peacetime Resistance - Lyrics by Kings of Convenience)

The above argument has suggested that there is still a lack of theoretical engagement with what has been here tentatively termed ‘Communication for Peace’ (C4P), which will be needed in order to better understand and evaluate the broad variety of interventions and dynamics which have been unfolding and are likely to increase, as for examples under the emerging doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (see e.g. Hoffmann & Okany\textsuperscript{101}). Inter alia, this suggests a need to critically analyze existing activities under the umbrella of ‘information intervention’, recognizing it explicitly as a subcategory of state- and peace-building activities.

The concept of peace building itself, however, has been the object of rigorous criticism.

As Richmond puts it, building on Foucault,

the liberal peace itself has been developed by a specific set of actors, according to a specific knowledge system and epistemic community, allied to a narrow set of interests, and a set of norms, institutions and techniques developed from there\textsuperscript{102}.

It is proposed here that whereas many of those criticisms can be applied to the current practice of local media projects and policy, more recent avenues of inquiry into forms of post-liberal peace may also offer fruitful perspectives for and ought to be especially interested in the field here termed C4P. The challenging question for communication scientists would then be to apply the current debates within the field of peace and

conflict studies to their own arena of research and actively contribute to its theory formation and empirical study.

Activities entailed in information/media interventions, for example, would then have to be seen and explicitly analyzed as part of the state and peace building arsenal. The only historical precedents for comprehensive post-conflict media intervention are the cases of Germany and Japan after World War II by the Allied Occupation Forces, which are, however, not necessarily comparable to more recently emerging efforts, which vary in the degree of scope of international authority to engage in such efforts.103 Whereas there is thus not yet a coherent international policy framework for this element of post-conflict peace building, there is a steady increase in ‘media mandates’ contained in UN Peacekeeping Missions as those in Cambodia, Bosnia, Eastern Slavonia and Kosovo.

In parallel, a certain degree of consensus of what one may call a mainstream approach to democratization and the media is crystallizing. Media ‘development’ thus mostly seeks to mold institutions and to ‘professionalize’ journalism along liberal peace lines. This translates into a reliance on the doctrinal assumptions of the ‘free flow of information’ and a ‘free marketplace of ideas’ that underlies liberal assumptions about the rationale and value of free speech.104 Media assistance’s aim will then usually be

- strengthening local journalism and management skills, reforming the legal and regulatory regimes,
- helping and nourishing civil society organizations that promote a free press, and building an institutional environment that is conducive to the free flow of information and ideas.104

As Blondel points out, such efforts are built on an implicit ‘common assumptions […] that models of successful democratic transition, in which the media played a key and positive role, as in Eastern and Central Europe during the Cold War, can apply to other regions105, thereby ignoring important differences such literacy rates or the degree of cohesion within societies. There have also been attempts to propose a kind of ‘blueprint’ for media sector development (e.g. Krug & Price106) with a visible focus on state building in its

104 Kumar, International Assistance to Promote Independent Media, 654. Emphasis mine.
See also Robertson et al, Media in Fragile environments for USIP’s perspective on the objectives of media interventions.
technocratic, procedural sense, focusing mainly on the rule of law and international legitimacy, again largely ignoring issues of local legitimacy, autonomy and agency, let alone avenues for hybridity to emerge. \(^\text{xvii}\) Elite capture of the institutions thus built have been a recurring obstacle encountered, mirroring the larger problem of liberal peace building practices\(^\text{107}\).

Related criticisms have been formulated when it comes to journalism education in many post-conflict environments (Lynch\(^\text{108}\); Banda\(^\text{109}\)). As Lynch comments concerning the current analyses of media interventions,

such accounts typically describe and discuss efforts by donors to implant western-style journalistic precepts and methods by a variety of means, including training, exhortation and regulation, in societies affected by violence\(^\text{110}\).

He subsequently detects current approaches’ continuing heavy reliance on modernization theory, ‘in which the expansion of privately held technological resources for communication is seen as a key to raising the level of both prosperity and democracy’\(^\text{111}\). In addition, the overall adequacy and applicability of such models of journalism in contexts varying from Burundi to the Philippines have been questioned\(^\text{112}\). In addition, journalism education initiatives from internationals routinely ignore existing local alternatives and contexts, e.g. notions such as Ubuntu and community journalism or historical contexts such as Tanzania’s model of Ujamaa journalism\(^\text{113}\).

Yet, even while there is now widespread consensus that for example the media intervention in Bosnia-Hercegovina was largely a failure, most authors suggest locating the

\(^\text{107}\) Richmond, \textit{A Pedagogy of Peacebuilding}, 7
\(^\text{108}\) Lynch, \textit{Modernisation or participatory development}, 291-304.
\(^\text{110}\) Ibid., 293.
\(^\text{111}\) Ibid., 293.
problem in the lack of planning, mismanagement or inconsequent adherence to the rule of law by the intervening party itself rather than the ideological assumptions underpinning such efforts (see e.g. Curtis; Price)\(^{114}\). Generally, the underlying normative frameworks that are being exported by means of media assistance that exports Anglo-American journalistic norms by means of journalism training or the setting up of structures for media to operate (e.g. a discernible favoritism towards commercial business models by US donors in contrast to a European preference for public service broadcasting models and a tendency towards unrestricted freedom of expression under all circumstances) is rarely interrogated (for notable exceptions see Snyder & Ballentine; Karlowicz; Allan & Stremlau; Putzel & van der Zwaan; Price, al-Marashi & Stremlau)\(^{115}\).

As Curtis frames the dilemma apparently facing donors in this regard,

> when donors help to support the development of a communications policy that is conducive to pluralism, they risk political opposition from people who claim that the concept of the free flow of ideas is a Western construct that is not appropriate in their society and culture\(^{116}\).

These ‘people’ here become the equivalent to the well-known ‘spoilers’ often blamed when debating failures of current peace building practices are concerned, so again, this seems to be a parallel with the wider criticisms leveled against current practices of state and peace building, as elaborated by Richmond\(^{117}\).

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\(^{116}\) Curtis, *Broadcasting Peace*, 152

\(^{117}\) Richmond, *A Pedagogy of Peacebuilding*, 1-17.
The research stream focusing on Peace Journalism is a potential other contender for such inquiry. Its proponents make their case by conceptualizing Peace Journalism as ‘remedial - a deliberate, creative strategy to seek out and bring to our attention those portions of ‘the facts’ routinely under-represented; the significant views and perspectives habitually unheard’, thereby explicitly challenging the existing, constructed, global information order that is apparent in information flows but also the content of news coverage of conflict, echoing concerns raised within the NWICO debates\textsuperscript{118}. While Lynch\textsuperscript{119} has sought to argue for Peace Journalism’s potential as the basis for a truly emancipatory methodology, building on critical pedagogy, in journalism training in post-conflict societies, also in this context, Richmond’s caution ought to be considered in its further analysis: ‘All must be wary […] of peace’s facilitators supplanting peace with their own interests, assumptions, or knowledge systems and of reiterating causal factors of conflict as if they were its solutions\textsuperscript{120}'. More explicitly ‘outcome oriented’ media such as e.g. Search For Common Ground’s television edutainment soap \textit{The Team}, are almost inherently open to such criticisms given their explicit aims of changing not only knowledge levels but crucially attitudes and behavior as well as larger cultural patterns, perceived to be detrimental to peace by the intervening party.

Lastly, it is worth noting that the basic tenets of what has been termed ‘peace formation\textsuperscript{121}’ have a number of shared aims and assumptions with the concept of and advocacy for communication rights: particularly when it comes to the need to create an ‘enabling environment’ to facilitate a deliberative process that may lead to truly emancipatory practices of negotiation along local-local axes, empowering bottom-up processes to manifest local agency, while at the same time establishing a truly democratic platform for exchange and engage with also the international level. Ultimately, current communication rights activism has aimed at democratizing communication itself (rather than viewing communication merely as a tool for democratization processes), recognized it as an act of power negotiation and addressing existing inequalities in power among the

\textsuperscript{118} Lynch & McGoldrick, \textit{Peace Journalism}, 224.
\textsuperscript{119} Lynch, \textit{Modernisation or participatory development}, 291-304.
\textsuperscript{120} Richmond, \textit{A Pedagogy of Peacebuilding}, 11.
\textsuperscript{121} Richmond, \textit{Failed Statebuilding Versus Peace Formation}. 

Peace Formation, Hybridity, Emancipation
The process of activism in this regard has in the past two decades been driven by a variety of civil society organizations, galvanized by the World Summit on the Information Society 2003/05 into a Campaign for Communication Rights in the Information Society (CRIS), including a diversity of organizations such as community media associations, development communication, language, gender and indigenous NGOs etc. The growing impact of new Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) has been a more recent focus of such advocacy along with more traditional concerns such as media ownership concentration, governance, censorship and surveillance. It has also given rise to new arguments for the democratization of the communication environment, considering issues such as the ‘digital divide’.

Similar foci are echoed within the community of practitioners employing media projects for peace building activities:

The use of the ‘new’ tools of communication by NGOs, multilaterals and governments is changing what information can be gathered and who can participate in the communication process and is opening up new spaces for the involvement of individuals and communities in crisis and disaster response, conflict monitoring and early warning, civilian protection, community peacebuilding, and state-building activities.\(^\text{123}\)

If post-liberal, hybrid forms of peace are dependent on commonly shared, inclusive and accessible channels for communication in order to stimulate ‘critical agency of a discursive nature’\(^\text{124}\), communication rights may be a worthwhile concept to consider in its further theorization. The potentially empowering tools of new networking technologies hold promise for the kind of dialectical interaction between the local and the international that is envisaged in this context. As Alegre and O’Siochru formulate it,

Communication rights are premised on communicating, the completion of an interaction between people; it maintains that freedom to interact with others is ultimately about generating a cycle of communication, from which learning, understanding and cooperation may ensue. An initial approximation of the goal of Communication Rights is thus: to secure the generation of a considered, creative and respectful cycle of interaction between people and groups in society, that in practice endorses the right of all equally to have their ideas expressed, heard, listened to, considered and responded to\(^\text{125}\).

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\(^{125}\) Alegre & O’Siochru, *Communication Rights*. 

31 | P a g e
Again, also in this context, new technological developments are providing new potentials to be tapped. As participants of the 2011 USIP workshop expect,

the increased availability of information will lead to a richer engagement between multilaterals, governments, NGOs, community-based organizations, and for-profits requiring a greater degree of cross-sectoral collaboration\textsuperscript{126}.

Clearly, those new tools have already been used by local agents to materialize initiatives tailored to local needs, such as Ushahidi, which developed out of collaboration between Kenyan citizen journalists during the post-election violence of 2008 in Kenya, using a combination of online mapping services and sms to visualize conflict developments in real-time and thus enable timely prevention and response. Such initiatives using crowd sourcing are only more likely to be used in the future and, given growth numbers of especially mobile phone usage in the Global South, provide enormous potential for local initiatives, donor ‘enabled’ or not.\textsuperscript{xxi} Facebook groups dedicated to peace\textsuperscript{xxii} or the more recent example of an Israeli couple that launched its own Facebook campaign, providing an easy-to-use template for fellow citizens to produce and post posters with the text ‘Iranians, we will never bomb your country. We \text{\ding{172}} You’ in order to disrupt the, in their perception, fear mongering and deterministic media and political discourse within their own society.\textsuperscript{xxiii} Another ongoing initiative for example is called PAX\textsuperscript{xxiv} which, supported by Google, is planning to combine information available online with mobile phone and satellite imagery to be used for conflict prevention purposes.

Blanket optimism and belief in transformation, however, would be unwarranted. Firstly, about two thirds of the world is still offline. Also, the use of new technologies not only enhances the opportunity of people to organize for peace, but also to enhance the vicious efficiency of witch hunts, hate speech and incitement. When employed to organize protesters to overthrow oppressive regimes, such as witnessed during the Arab Spring of 2011 (though the most recent data call into question the decisive role played by new media in this regard\textsuperscript{xxv}) using these new technologies also comes with great risks since it assembles vital information on individuals as well as groups by creating vast databases of traffic data, which would have been unthinkable just some years ago. This way, the powers of repressive actors to surveil and track opponents (that often lack the skills to ensure basic online safety, but are also increasingly being targeted by ever more

\textsuperscript{126} A. Robertson, E. Fraenkel, E. Schoemaker and S. Himelfarb, S., \textit{Media in Fragile environments}, 4.
sophisticated surveillance software, largely produced in Western countries and exported) is equally enhanced to an unprecedented level (see e.g. Morozov\textsuperscript{127}). In this light, recent evidence for example of the Syrian regime’s abilities to adapt to the new media environment and make use of it for its own purposes\textsuperscript{128} indicate while much has changed, it would be premature to simply discard the importance of understanding ‘traditional’ media or to leave the onus of building lasting peace on an anonymous masse of individuals-turned-citizen journalists-cum-activists assumed to be somehow automatically altering the balance of power in a constructive and towards a more peaceful future, all just by the click of a mouse.

Also in this context, it would be unwise to expect social media to be used exclusively from the ‘bottom up’ or for them to be inherently emancipator, of course. For example, the Kony 2012 campaign comes to mind, which has been widely criticized for calling for (and having eventually brought about) more external intervention, its odd timing when the hot phase of the conflict within Uganda seems to have had subsided, an ethnocentric and biased portrayal of the situation and, in general, for being patronizing and quintessentially neo-colonial in outlook with its tendency towards glorification and Western heroism, over-simplifying a complex conflict and eclipsing local voices and agency. So, as with any other ‘new’ technology that brought about - or seemed to bring about - radical departures, ‘[i]ts merits are wholly dependent upon those who wield its power, and their willingness to make a concerted effort to understand its capacities, which include both its values and its dangers’\textsuperscript{xxvi}.

8. Conclusions

Communication for Peace is a field of human activity that deserves more systematic attention from scholars of many disciplines that would benefit greatly from more cross-pollination between hitherto rather insulated disciplines including international law, communication science and peace and conflict studies. The present article has sought to outline a number of existing research strands considered relevant to this endeavor and to show that the conceptualization of communication underlying most scholarly as well as

\textsuperscript{127} Evgeny Morozov, \textit{The Net Delusion: How not to liberate the world} (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).

practical approaches to communication and media within peace building efforts today are biased towards a rather narrow understanding of its role to convince, explain and change. Communication is seen essentially as a tool rather than an end in itself and conceptualized as form of transferring knowledge and ideas, in some instances acknowledging the need to listen, but more often than not merely in order to sustain intended outcomes; rarely as an interactive process that could engender emancipation. Thus, the prerequisite conditions for such a process are not discussed and media development strategies - even if still far from uniform - are based generally uncritically on the liberal peace agenda. Notions of post-liberal, hybrid forms of peace or processes of peace formation have been put forward as potentially fruitful to inform future research.

If one wanted to draw parallels to the developments within Communication for Development, one could say that early modernization theories implicitly assumed that part of a process of development as envisaged from this perspective - inter alia through implanting modern ideas through mass media in ‘under-developed’ societies - would eventually also decrease conflict. The phase of criticisms of this approach - in the form of dependency critiques - has however not been as pronounced when it comes to efforts under the banner of peacebuilding (rather than development), it seems. So nowadays, a version of the McDonald’s hypothesis seem to be the driving force of large donors investing in communication and media projects: democratize for peace, since democracies do not go to war with each other - making communication often synonymous with the media system as just another part of the state building arsenal. The post-liberal peace critique problematizes these assumptions and challenges us to make explicit our conceptualizations, not only of peace, but also of communication and the underlying assumptions that inform interventions.

At the same time, internationals’ interventions and efforts to mold media landscapes are by no means the only relevant avenue of inquiry when it comes to communication for peace. So far, however, fragmentation of the research agenda has prevented the formation of a more lucid conceptualization of the field.

Here, it will be proposed that as basic grid to help clarify our thinking about C4P could be based on making the following distinctions when situating different approaches to the subject: Channels/tools; Enabling environment; Actors; Content; Process; Skills; Effects/roles.
Some research questions/avenues of inquiry

Given the overlapping, but distinct aims of agendas for development and peace building, to what extent can theories of communication for development inform theory formation of communication for peace?

Analysis and formulation of criteria to elaborate case studies of media roles in establishing a ‘culture of peace’ (through ending cultural and symbolic violence, promoting nonviolence, and facilitating a mode of emancipatory, relational communication).

Could arguments made from a Communication Rights perspective, be effectively wielded to frame resistance? Or are they already?

Internationals and communication

Examine paradigms of state- and peace building that inform activities under the umbrella of information intervention, including media development and restructuring policies of international actors (such as the Office of the High Representative and the OECE in Bosnia-Hercegovina), nation states (such as the US in Iraq) as well as NGOs (such as journalism training) in post-conflict environments.

More specifically, to what extent has there been a shift in the approach taken towards communication (for a tool to explain and justify towards a process of empowerment?) from second to third generation peace operations?

If Peace building is to be ‘reframed as a process that constructs the everyday according to how its subjects need and want to live, where rights and needs are both contextually and internationally negotiated and enabled’¹²⁹, what would this imply for the aims, methods and legitimacy criteria for policies of media interventions in post-conflict environments?

The local

As Blondel¹³⁰ has pointed out, it is mostly international media (actors) that get most attention in much of the research on the role of media in conflicts, whereas relatively little attention is given to the conflict-management role of the local media. So, there are existing projects that ought still to be examined within the post-liberal peace paradigm

¹²⁹ Richmond, Failed Statebuilding Versus Peace Formation.
¹³⁰ Blondel, International Media get the most Attention, 27-31.
such as e.g. the Synergy project before and during the latest elections in Burundi, that may serve as an interesting case study of a local, ‘donor-enabled’ initiative (see e.g. Frère\textsuperscript{131}). Concerning the emerging hybridity in peace building initiatives then, how can this be seen in the field of media for peace building projects?

To the extent that social media, on the basis of their inherent networking capabilities and therefore at least theoretical independence of hierarchical or outside interventions, can be an effective means for the emergence of local peace initiatives, what are the characteristics of such phenomena? How is peace communicated and engaged with here?

In the light of Richmond’s elaboration of post-liberal forms of peace, which

\begin{quote}
would be wary of sovereignty, whether of a state or an international actor, donor, agency, the UN, or of institutional prescriptions for the territorial, cultural, economic, social, political, historical, and aesthetic dimensions of a locally owned peace, whereby its subjects become ‘poets of their own affairs’\textsuperscript{132},
\end{quote}

when it comes to forms of communication such as theater and art, how are they being employed to engender processes of peace formation?

\textit{Hybridity}

What forms of interaction, communication between the different layers from local-local to international can be identified and how and to what extent have they led to adaptations and reformulations of peace; perhaps in response to resistance to dominant variants of peace building and thus with the potential to, by active engagement, renegotiate its norms and values to produce hybrid forms that may be more appropriate and sustainable in a given context?

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{132} Oliver P. Richmond, \textit{A Post-Liberal Peace} (London: Routledge 2011).
\end{footnotesize}
Appendix: End Notes

1 The faith in this power of the media, however, within the field of communication science, has largely been mitigated by media effects research and after an initial phase characterized by assumptions of linearity and causality, quickly led to a paradigm of ‘limited effects’

2 So, as e.g. an OHR statement explained the aims of its restructuring of the regulatory regime of the media: ‘To establish, countrywide, a regulatory regime equating to models operating in other democratic, plural societies’ (as cited in Price, 2002: 100).

3 While the latter report proposed a ‘new model’ for communication in fragile states and promised to launch a publication series that aimed at closing the knowledge gaps it had spotted, CommGAP (the program funding the series) was discontinued in October 2011.

4 For an attempt to visualize the large variety of tools and foci that can be found on the ground, see for example the report of an expert workshop convened in 2011 by USIP.

5 Recent examples of the promise of such projects include the setting up of Koch FM, the first ‘ghetto community radio station in Kenya’, located in the country’s third biggest slum, Korogocho and founded by a group of young local people, aided by the Open Society Institute and the Norwegian ChurchAid. When in 2008, violence broke out throughout Kenya in the wake of elections, Korogocho with its reputation for violence, poverty, ethnic diversity and large group of Somali residents, could have been a natural focal point to expect escalations. Instead, unlike neighboring slums, it remained calm. The radio, initiated to provide a platform for residents to exchange information and communicate about common issues and provide ‘edutainment’ (educational programming in an entertainment format) programming to address themes such as gender equality, youth rights or HIV and AIDS, reacted to the mounting political tensions by collecting and disseminating appeals for peace by leading local leaders that have been credited for having contributed to Korogocho’s relative calm amidst violence and broader change towards more accountable and transparent local governance. Anticipating the 2013 elections, the station is currently seeking to prepare the ground for it remaining peaceful. http://idd.edc.org/projects/somali-interactive-radio-instruction-program-sirip

6 However, UN radio stations have traditionally per definition been meant to be transitory; so also in this field, so-called ‘asset stripping’ when missions end has been widely criticized with radio stations being taken down with mission’s end (whereas, also here, gradual change seems to have taken place: for example, in 2003, the UN turned over its radio station to the government to become the national radio of Timor-Leste).

7 Faced in Sierra Leone with a population with 70-80% of illiteracy and weak, polarized and capital centered local media; it was also the first to launch a radio program designed, produced and broadcast by children between the age of 5 to 18.

8 In the case of Kosovo, for example, the cooperation between the UN mission and the Hirondelle Foundation to set up Blue Skies Radio in 1999 can be seen as a compromise between setting up a UN station and donor interests such as USAID’s, which opposed such a move on the grounds that it would have detrimental effects on developing independent media in a commercial marketplace as well as concerns, such a then voiced by the OSCE, that a UN station would cannibalize on local journalistic resources needs for a public service broadcaster (Manuel, 2004). The latter debate mirrors a deeper rift between US and European ideas about the ‘proper’ path of media development. The cooperation between the UN and Hirondelle has also been followed in creating Radio Okapi in 2002 in the DRC. This time with editorial control lying with the UN’s MUNOC mission
As mentioned earlier, the latter has arguably been a more explicit focus of research in the field, with media being generally recognized not so much as separate external actors, but rather an integral part of their larger social system: ‘As journalists are members of the society themselves, they are vulnerable also to the same processes of social identification with the own sides’ elites, soldiers and victims and to the dehumanization of those on the opposing side’ (Kempf, 2009: 70). Yet, the role media can play in these dynamics has also been recognized as a phenomenon that be analyzed separately that has specific characteristics that may exacerbate conflicts and inter alia make media vulnerable to manipulation by elites (see e.g. Herman & Chomsky’s propaganda model (1988); Bennett’s indexing hypothesis (1990); Entman’s cascading activation model (2003)) - and that could therefore importantly also be altered in ways that might also contribute to de-escalatory dynamics and long-term peace.

The latter may be seen as a rare attempt to critically evaluate the ideological underpinnings of global efforts of media development and seeks to propose a new standard of Peace Journalism as a tool for emancipation by means of critical pedagogy (ibid).

The Ushahidi example which is an interactive web-mapping platform which has been used in more than 20,000 separate cases in around 132 countries is a way in which a comprehensive picture of different eyewitness accounts of violence can be reported through using texts from people on the ground and then displaying these reports through free and online tools such as Google Maps. The Ushahidi example has garnered a lot of expectations from different actors but the gap between creating and sharing knowledge about an issue and then acting on it has not yet been successfully addressed.

Once again, it seems that the area of health care seems to be playing a pioneering role, which is likely to inform activities in this area as well, with eHealth being a vibrant area of practice and research.

So, for example, YaLa Young Leaders launched by Israeli and Palestinian citizens has successfully used Facebook, inter alia to stage parallel events to official several peace talks.

See also UNESCO model code for post-conflict criminal justice, inter alia concerning hate speech.

Interestingly, while Kumar emphasizes that one should not confuse the aims of media assistance with those of public diplomacy, he also implies that the suppression of the freedom of speech in ‘these countries’ may explain ‘public anger and frustration against the government is often directed towards the West, particularly the US’ (2006: 654). He does not seem to see the need to further explore potentially legitimate reasons for any such emotions or reactions of resistance.

For example, Open Broadcasting Network in Bosnia set up by the Office of the High Representative was set up with very little input from Bosnians themselves and consequently came to be identified as a foreign station (Curtis, 2011: 59).

Peace Journalism as an idea was introduced by Johan Galtung in the 1970s and is perhaps the only stream of communication science literature that has explicitly sought to incorporate the basics of peace and conflict studies into the study of journalism. Its critics are numerous, mostly concentrating on the assumed perils of confusing journalism with peace activism and its impact on notions of ‘objectivity’ (e.g. Hanitzsch, 2004; Loyn, 2007).

Already in the context of the NWICO process, the call for a new ‘right to communicate’ had been formulated, perhaps most powerfully in the MacBride Commissions’ 1980 report to the UN General Assembly, One World, Many Voices, which notes inter alia ‘Communication needs in a democratic society should be met by the extension of specific rights such as the right to be informed, the right to inform, the right to privacy, the right
to participate in public communication - all elements of a new concept, the right to communicate. In developing what might be called a new era of social rights, we suggest all the implications of the right to communicate be further explored.' (emphasis added).

See also the initiative to endorse a People’s Communication Charter and the Platform for Democratization of Communication started during the 1990s.

See e.g. http://findingwhatworks.org/2012/05/08/ushahidi-collaborative-crisis-mapping/

http://peace.facebook.com/

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xrhtFKE2V4I

For example, a 2012 study finds that ‘at least in terms of media that use bit.ly links (especially Twitter), data do not provide strong support for claims of significant new media impact on Arab Spring political protests’ (Aday, Farrell, Lynch, Sides & Freelon, Blogs and Bullets II, 2012).

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